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"There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, uncreated, unconditioned."2
1 I would like to thank Joanna Jurewicz for reading the manuscript and for her clarifying comments. 
2 atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhataṃ, Ud. 8.3.
202
BOOK REVIEWS
In the following paragraphs I will review a very interesting but highly technical 
book by a Polish scholar, Professor Joanna Jurewicz from the University of 
Warsaw. This monograph is a result of many years of research and can be 
considered as an enlargement of her habilitation work.3
Putting Professor Jurewicz's work in context
Professor Jurewicz is an indologist, a distinguished Vedic scholar, but she has 
also made important discoveries in the field of Buddhology.
One of her first discoveries was published in the The Journal of the Pāli 
Text Society: "Playing with Fire: the pratītyasamutpāda from the Perspective of 
Vedic thought."4 In this article Professor Jurewicz related the terms and concepts 
of the famous Nāsadīya-sūkta to the chains (nidāna) of dependent origination 
(pratītyasamutpāda), and by the help of this connection she could "decipher the 
original meaning of the chain".5
In her own words:
"The character of the similarities between the Vedic creation and the 
pratītyasamutpāda enables us to propose a tentative reconstruction 
of the line of the Buddha's argument, which consisted in the 
redefinition of Brāhmaṇic notions and ideas."6
"It seems that the Buddha chose those cosmogonic descriptions which 
met two conditions: first, they explicitly express the cosmogony as 
transformations of the ātman; second, they preserve their cognitive 
meaning, even if they are taken out of the Vedic context."7
3 Jurewicz 2001.
4 Jurewicz 2000.
5 Gombrich 2009: IX.
6 Jurewicz 2000: 79.
7 Ibid.: 80. She summarizes the different roles of the ātman in Vedic cosmogony (viewed as a 
cognitive process) and the Buddha's reaction in this way: "In Vedic cosmogony, the cognitive process 
is undertaken by the self-cognizing Absolute. The reflexive character of this process is expressed by the 
word ātman, which denotes both the Absolute itself, the conveyor of the cosmogonic process, and the 
forms assumed by the Absolute in this process: the world, the human being, the inner Self, and finally the 
fire altar, which expresses those manifestations on the ritual level. The negation of the ātman's existence 
postulated in the Buddha's doctrine of anattā leads to the conclusion that the whole Vedic cosmogony is 
based on a false assumption and its acceptance inevitably leads only to suffering." (Ibid.: 78.)
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"At the same time, it seems that the Buddha (perhaps for polemical 
purposes) aimed greatly to simplify the Vedic ideas; the most 
important result of this is that he let go the cyclical character of the 
process: the pratītyasamutpāda is a simple, linear process."8 
This "simple, linearized" approach is a bit misleading, but it helped to realize 
the deep connections between Vedic and Buddhist thought.
 The importance of dependent origination in all of the Buddhist traditions can 
not be overestimated:9
"The essential aim of Dependent Origination is to illustrate the 
origin and cessation of suffering (dukkha)."10 "The teaching of 
Dependent Origination reveals [the] three characteristics11 and 
describes the interrelated sequence of phenomena." "All natural 
processes, including the dynamics of kamma, are possible because 
things are impermanent and insubstantial."12 
It is worth noting that any really non-substantialist account of the process 
should be, in a sense, circular (or at least cyclical). So it is not surprising 
that dependent arising has already been interpreted not only linearly, but also 
cyclically or even circularly from very early times.13
Professor Jurewicz's note is quite relevant here: 
"I would also like to stress that I am aware that the interpretation of the 
pratītyasamutpāda as a polemic against the Vedic cosmogony tackles only one 
aspect of this huge problem; as the Buddha said to ānanda: 'This conditioned 
origination is profound and it appears profound'."14 
8 Jurewicz 2000, 81.
9 A clear and beautiful exposition of the traditional interpretation of dependent origination can 
be found in Payutto 2011: 3–17.
10 Ibid.: 15. 
11 (i) Impermanence and instability (aniccatā), (ii) inherent stress, conflict and imperfection 
(dukkhatā) and (iii) essential 'selflessness' or insubstantiality (anattatā). (Ibid.: 17.)
12 Ibid.: 18.
13 The analysis of the difference between circular and cyclical interpretations exceeds the 
limitations of this review and will be discussed in a different paper. For an account of the different 
interpretations of pratītyasamutpāda see Payutto 2011.
14 gambhīro cāyam ānanda paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca, D II 55, Gombrich's 




Professor Gombrich assessed the worth of her research with the following 
enthusiastic words:
"Given the centrality to Buddhist doctrine of dependent 
origination, I think this [discovery of Professor Jurewicz] may 
rank as one of the most important discoveries ever made in 
Buddhology’."15 
About the reviewer
I have also been interested in the Nāsadīya since I first met it at the Benedictine 
Monastery of Pannonhalma in 1976. I wrote a poetic commentary to the hymn 
in 1989 which was published as the last chapter of my book on the cosmogonic 
hymns of the Ṛgveda.16 It consists of fourteen poems using each half stanza 
(pāda) of the triṣṭubh verse as guidance. My commentary is a non-linear and 
non-substantialist interpretation of the Nāsadīya according to which creation is 
a participatory process.17
Research methodology used in her scientific articles and in the book
In her research Professor Jurewicz not only uses extensively the available 
concepts and methods of cognitive linguistics, but also introduces new ones 
whenever it becomes necessary. For a proper understanding of her thoughts 
one has to be familiar with the conceptual apparatus of cognitive linguistics 
and the way she uses it. For this purpose reading and analysing her book, then 
meditating upon its content is the best choice.
Meaning in cognitive linguistics
In cognitive linguistics meanings are seen as emerging dynamically in discourse 
and social interaction:
15 Gombrich 2005: 154.
16 Fórizs 1995.
17 Ibid.: 74–97 & 153–170. See also Fórizs 2002: 113 (endnote iii); 2005; 2013c; 2016a: 117–
119, especially notes 3–6 to the translation and interpretation of the Gāyatrī-mantra (RV 3.62.10) 
in BU 6.3.7 and [2003/]2016b.
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”Rather than being fixed and predetermined, they are actively 
negotiated by interlocutors on the basis of the physical, 
linguistic, social, and cultural context. Meaning is not localized 
but distributed, aspects of it inhering in the speech community, 
in the pragmatic circumstances of the speech event, and in the 
surrounding world. In particular, it is not inside a single speaker’s 
head. The static, insular view ascribed to cognitive semantics 
is deemed incapable of handling the dynamic, intersubjective, 
context-dependent nature of meaning construction in actual 
discourse.”18
In looking for meaning in the Ṛgveda Professor Jurewicz follows this 
guidance throughout her book.
Content of the book
The book consists of a long and important Introduction, three Parts and five 
Appendices. 
In the first chapter of the Introduction the author outlines the basic concepts 
and assumptions of cognitive linguistics and explains how to use them in the 
analysis of the Ṛgveda.19 
The second chapter gives a new and insightful interpretation of the famous 
Nāsadīyasūkta by applying the methods of cognitive linguistics.20
18 Langacker 2008: 28.
19 Her main focus remains on Ṛgvedic metaphysics throughout the book: "In my investigation 
of the RV I will apply the main concepts of cognitive linguistics and analyze the text according 
to the assumptions of this discipline. ...However, I should mention that conceptual metonymies, 
metaphors and blends are discussed in this book only to the extent necessary for the reconstruction 
of metaphysical assumptions; their full reconstruction still awaits a detailed exploration. I am 
mostly interested in how general and abstract thought emerges from its experiential ground and 
how we can reconstruct the fiery core of Ṛgvedic metaphysics." (Jurewicz 2010: 43.)
20 To see the relevance of Jurewicz's research on the Nāsadīya to our understanding of early 
Buddhist thought it is enough to quote Gombrich: "In arriving at my own ideas, I owe enormous 
intellectual debts, above all to Joanna Jurewicz and to Sue Hamilton. ...Her demonstration that 
the Buddha is always talking about experience chimes beautifully with Joanna Jurewicz's early 
work on the Ṛg Vedic 'Hymn of Creation', in which she shows how from the recorded beginnings 
of Indian thought, existence and consciousness are intertwined. Though the Buddha disentangled 
them, this philosophy of experience, as one might call it, influenced him profoundly. Joanna 
Jurewicz's other discoveries are no less momentous. Not only has she deciphered the original 
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The remaining chapters of the book are divided into three parts: Part I. 
The defining events. Part II. Philosophical models. Part III. Gods' activities 
and metaphysics. Professor Jurewicz gives the following summary of these 
parts:
"In the first part, I discuss the defining events and I demonstrate 
how the unified concepts of fundamental processes are created 
and how they can be evoked in the description of the Nāsadīya. 
I also present the basic assumptions of the Ṛgvedic cosmology 
according to which the processes of the world are seen as 
transformations of Agni. 
The second part of my book is devoted to the analysis of the 
philosophical models: I examine their conceptual structure and 
links with the Nāsadīya. I also reconstruct Ṛgvedic metaphysics 
and anthropology, which were organised around the concept of 
Agni.
In the third and final part I focus on the concepts of four Ṛgvedic 
gods (Indra, Bṛhaspati, Viṣṇu and Varuṇa). I discuss their 
relationships with the defining events on the one hand and with the 
Nāsadīya on the other, how activities of the gods are elaborated 
within the frames of philosophical models and the tendency of the 
poets to identify these gods with Agni."21
The last chapter of the book summarizes the main results concerning the 
Ṛgvedic gods, Agni and the Nāsadīya:
"The only Ṛgvedic concept of a god which became metaphysically 
productive was the concept of Agni conceived as internally 
contradictory reality."22
meaning of the chain of dependent origination. Her discovery of belief in rebirth in the Ṛg Veda 
also makes the entire early history of Indian religion far more plausible and coherent. I wonder 
whether any other single scholar in the last hundred years has made so important a contribution to 
the field." (Gombrich 2009: IX–X.; see also Jurewicz 2000.)




"Seen in this way the cosmogony of the Nāsadīya is a story about 
the liberation of the Absolute and of human beings which is gained 
in cognition. This is the kernel of the RV put in general terms. 
However, it is enough to replace the concept of the Absolute with 
that of Agni to unfold the way to the metaphysics of fire."23
At the end of the book there are four very useful appendices for the interested 
reader to pursue: 
I. Main conceptual metaphors in the RV analysed in the book24 
II. Main conceptual metonymies in the RV analysed in the book 
III. The Ṛgvedic general domains and the general model of reality 
transformation 
IV. Diagrams of (eight) philosophical models25
The conceptual apparatus introduced by Professor Jurewicz
According to cognitive linguistics the main mental operations are metonymy 
and metaphor. They are based on the projection of one conceptual entity onto 
another conceptual entity (mapping).
"As a cognitive phenomenon, the word meaning is motivated 
by mental operations such as metonymy and metaphor. 
Metonymy is a mental strategy, which gives access to a whole 
conceptual domain via its salient point (e.g. “head” is a salient 
point of “person”). Metaphor is a mental strategy which allows 
humans to think about a conceptual domain in terms of another 
domain (e.g. we conceive time in terms of money). Whenever 
I use the words 'metonymy' and 'metaphor', I understand them 
like this."26
23 Cf. ibid: 440.
24 The main metaphors concerning the Absolute analysed by Jurewicz: The Absolute 
Is A Human Being, The Absolute Is The Other, The Absolute Is A Warrior, The World Is 
A Living Being, A Group Of Living Beings Is An Organism.
25 There is also a fifth appendix: Stanzas discussed in the book.
26 Jurewicz 2012: 3.
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In her reconstruction Professor Jurewicz not only makes extensive use of the 
available conceptual apparatus of cognitive linguistics,27 but she also introduces 
new concepts and models suitable for her investigation: 
Defining events
"In their hymns, the Ṛgvedic poets referred to some basic cosmic 
and ritual processes in such a way that they focussed more on their 
similar features than on differences between them. Thanks to that 
they could ...create a conceptual apparatus in terms of which they 
could express philosophical content. I call these basic cosmic and 
ritual processes the defining events." 28
The defining events are divided into three groups by Professor Jurewicz: 
(i) the expansion
(ii) the appearance of the morning light
(iii) the pressing of Soma.
General domains 
"The Ṛgvedic poets organised their thought with more general 
concepts which I will call 'the general domains' and which betray a 
tendency to abstract concrete experience in order to express various 
phenomena and processes."29
The general domains can refer to 
(i) natural phenomena (Water and A Rocky Hill), 
27 "In reconstructing the meaning of the Ṛgvedic words I accept the principles of cognitive 
linguistics, according to which language is grounded in human cognition and words reflect what 
people think about entities, relations or states named by them." Jurewicz 2012: 2.
28 Jurewicz 2010, 24. In other words: "Defining events are the domains which refer to the most 
important experiences of the Ṛgvedic poets and which most strongly influenced their thinking. ... 
I call them defining events because of their formative influence on Ṛgvedic thinking and because 




(ii) objects (A Vessel Filled with Liquid) 
(iii) activities (Procreation, Creation of Space, Finding the Hidden, 
Freeing Cows and Cleansing by Heat).
Philosophical models and the general model of reality transformation
We can speak about such general models of reality within which the poets of 
the Ṛgveda arranged their philosophical ideas. Professor Jurewicz distinguishes 
two types of them:
"The first kind are models which encompass as wide a range of 
processes as possible; such models highlight the links between 
them but the recipient is expected to imagine the processes in 
concrete detail. These models are called 'philosophical models'. 
The second kind of model is the 'general model of reality 
transformation' which reduces all processes into one simple 
schema of transformations of opposing aspects of Agni."30
The philosophical model is nothing else than a complex conceptual 
integration (blend31). It is a model of reality which integrates "its various 
processes and phenomena so that the recipient can see correspondences 
between them."32
"The Ṛgvedic blends prompt their recipient to create complex, 
holistic notions of various aspects of reality or of reality as a whole. 
Some input spaces are abstract and general, others are closely 
connected with concrete phenomena and processes. Thanks to 
30 Ibid: 24.
31 Blending or conceptual integration is a kind of generalization of metaphors introduced by 
Fauconnier and Turner some twenty years ago. Jurewicz gives the following brief account of 
their concepts in the Introduction: "They constructed a basic theoretical model consisting of four 
conceptual wholes called 'mental spaces' which are integrated during cognitive processing. Two 
of these spaces are called input spaces. They partially map their content onto a third space, called 
emergent space. The fourth space is generic space. ...Conceptual integration involves compression 
of vital conceptual relations which are neurobiologically rooted, such as Cause-Effect, Analogy/
Disanalogy, Time, Space, Change, Identity, Part-Whole and Representation. (Jurewicz 2010: 30, 
see also Fauconnier – Turner 2002.)
32 The main aim of a philosophical model is "to express the cosmogony and functioning of the 
world and of human beings". (Jurewicz 2010: 40.)
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this it becomes possible to create emergent spaces which unfold 
an overall and, at the same time, a very detailed vision of all 
reality. The Ṛgvedic conceptual blends attest to the ability to unite 
abstract and general thinking with rich imagery, deeply grounded 
in experience. The poets skilfully balanced these two ways of 
thinking and invited their recipients to do the same."33
The following philosophical models are discussed by Professor Jurewicz:
(i) the model of Child of the Waters 
(ii) the model of the Boiled in the Raw 
(iii) the model of the Wave of Honey 
(iv) the model of Streams of Clarified Butter 
(v) the model of the Aṅgirases Freeing Cows 
(vi) the model of Indra's Fight with Vṛtra
(vii) the model of Footprints of Viṣṇu 
(viii) the model of the Copper Pillar.
The general model of reality transformation is the most abstract and general 
category which can be reconstructed on the basis of the Ṛgvedic text. 
"It shows how reality is created and how the function of the world and 
human beings can be transformed into a simple schema of alternate 
transformations of Agni and Soma. In this model, the concepts of 
Agni and Soma are almost devoid of their concrete semantic layers 
of fire and plant/juice and of their godhead and rather refer to the 
opposing aspects of internally contradictory reality. This manifests 
itself in creation, in processes of the world (sunrise and raining) and 
in the activity of  human beings (ritual and cognition)."34
33 "The model operates only conceptually and is never expressed in words explicitly but is 
implied by the way various processes and phenomena are presented in the RV, both by the defining 




The aim of the book
What Professor Jurewicz strives to demonstrate in her book is that "the successive 
stages of creation are expressed in the Nāsadīya in such a way that they evoke 
concepts which not only facilitate understanding of the creative process but 
evoke earlier thinking about creation."35
"It will be shown that the scenario of the creative process expressed 
by the Nāsadīya agrees with the scenario of the defining events and 
of cosmogony described in the philosophical models. In my opinion 
this basic similarity shows that thinking about cosmogony was 
motivated by thinking about the defining events and – generally – by 
this earlier thought. The analysis presented in the next chapters will 
also reveal those semantic layers of the Nāsadīya that are impossible 
to discover without knowledge of its Ṛgvedic background. I will 
also show that the myths describing activity of various gods describe 
processes the scenario of which agrees with the scenario of creation 
presented at the Nāsadīya  — at least in its basic outline."36
Appreciation of Professor Jurewicz's work
It is an impossible task to do justice in just a few pages to such a momentous 
enterprise as Professor Jurewicz's book. It is full of brave and original thoughts 
revealed by the help of the conceptual apparatus and extended methods of 
cognitive linguistics. This monograph opens up new perspectives in the study 
of the Ṛgveda and is in a sense complementary to the historical reconstruction 
of Michael Witzel.37
In the following paragraphs I will restrict myself to a few critical remarks 
which are primarily related to the Nāsadīya. 
Translation of the Nāsadīya38 
Because of its importance I will quote the complete hymn in the translation of 
Professor Jurewicz together with her summary of her interpretation.
35 Ibid.: 59. In her opinion this was an intentional act of the composer of the hymn.
36 Ibid.: 59.
37 Witzel 1995abc.
38 For the text, see Appendix.
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"1. There was neither being/truth nor non-being/untruth then. There 
was neither space nor the heaven which is above. What was 
concealing/What was moving? Where? In whose protection? 
Was there the water unfathomable, deep? 
2. There was neither death nor immortality there. There was no 
sign of day and of night. That One was breathing breathlessly 
with its own will. There was nothing else beyond it.
3. Darkness was hidden by darkness in the beginning. Everything 
was flood without any sign. What was about to be/what was 
empty was surrounded by the void. That was born thanks to the 
power of heat — One. 
4. Desire firstly came upon that which was the first semen of 
thought/mind. The poets, having searched in the heart with 
reflection, found the kinship of being/truth in non-being/untruth.
5. Their ray/reins streamed sideways. Was there anything below? 
Was there anything above? There were givers of semen, there 
were powers — will below, endeavour above.
6–7. Who truly knows? Who could proclaim here whence it is born? 
Whence is this creation? The gods later, with the creation of 
this. So who knows whence this has come into being? Whence 
has this creation come to being? It has either placed itself or it 
has not. Who its eye-witness in the highest heaven, he either 
knows or does not know."39
Interpretation of the Nāsadīya
According to Professor Jurewicz the process of creation presented in the 
Nāsadīya can be divided into the following stages (with the corresponding 
formulaic expressions in brackets):
"0. The precreative inexpressible state ('There was neither being/truth 
nor non-being/untruth then')
39 Jurewicz 2010: 48–55.
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1. The first act is the passage from the precreative inexpressible 
state to the state which can be expressed ('That One was 
breathing breathlessly with its own will')
2. The Absolute's inchoate division into aspects unmanifested and 
manifested ('darkness was hidden by darkness in the beginning')
3. The appearance of the first expressible form of the manifested 
aspect ('everything was flood without any sign')
4. The final constitution of the manifested aspect ('That which was 
about to be/that which was empty was surrounded by the void. 
That was born thanks to the power of heat —One.')40
5. The appearance of desire for the manifested aspect ('desire firstly 
came upon that which was the first semen of thought/mind')
6. The creative activity of the poets ('The poets, having searched in 
the heart with their thinking, found the kinship of being/truth in 
non-being/untruth. Their ray/reins streamed sideways')
7. Realisation of the creative activity by concrete human beings 
(stanzas 6–7)."41
Comment on the Nāsadīya
First of all I agree with almost all of the translation. The proper understanding of 
its formulaic language is indeed one of the keys to the hymn.
My comment is on stanza 5a, tiraścī́no vítato raśmír eṣām adháḥ svid āsī́3d 
upári svid āsī3t. In her translation: 
“Their ray/reins streamed sideways. 
Was there anything below? Was there anything above?"42
40 "Thus That One finally organises and determines itself. The opposition of both spheres, the 
hiding and the hidden one, becomes unequivocal. The dark void – That One which is not to be – 
is called non-being/untruth (ásat). The heated object of cognition – That One which has come to 





"raśmí is usually interpreted as 'cord'; some scholars identify it with bándhu 
from the previous stanza. raśmí, however, means first of all 'the ray of the sun' 
and 'reins' of a chariot'. Both meanings evoke the concept of the sun: in the case 
of 'ray' the metonymy Ray for the Sun (Part for Whole) operates, in case of 
'reins' the metaphoric mappings the Sun is a Horse, the Sun is a Chariot can be 
activated."43
I am not convinced that 'cord' is not an acceptable meaning for raśmí here.
Geldner translates 'measuring cord' (Richtschnur):44 
"Quer hindurch ward ihre Richtschnur gespannt, 
Gab es denn ein Unten, gab es denn ein Oben?";45
Elizarenkova also gives 'cord' (shnur) for raśmí.46
Joel Brereton renders the lines as:
"Their cord was stretched across:
Did something exist below it? Did something exist above?"47
Michael Witzel also uses the same word in his translation:
"'Obliquely stretched out was their cord. 
Was there really 'below'? Was there really 'above'?"48
Macdonell hesitated about the meaning of raśmí. In his Vedic reader he translated: 
“Their cord was extended across: was there below or was there above?”49
For raśmí he wrote the following: 
43 Ibid.: 53.
44 Grassmann 1873 allows 'allegorically' (bildlich) 'reins' (Zügel) here, but he gives 'measuring 
cord' (Messschnur) in RV 8.25.18. See also Mayrhofer 1996 (EWA): raśanā́-, f. Strick, Seil, 
Halfter (RV+) ...Von raśmí- (~raśmán-) nicht zu trennen. raśmí-, m. Zügel, Zugseil, Leitsel (RV+ 
[meist im Plur.; übertragen auch 'Strahl', s. Renou, EVP 3 (1957) 52]). 
45 Geldner 1951, Volume 35: 360.
46 Elizarenkova 1999: 286.
47 Brereton 1999: 256.
48 Professor Witzel's translation is excellent; however, I do not understand why he uses the 
adjective 'salty' in verse 3b: "A featureless salty ocean was all this (universe)." (Witzel 2012: 107) 
It is an unnecessary etymologization which disrupts the imagery of the hymn.





"the meaning of this word here is uncertain, but it may be an 
explanation of bándhu in 4 c: the cord with which the sage (referred 
to by eṣām) in thought measured out the distance between the 
existent and non-existent, or between what was above and below.”50 
On the other hand, in his metric translation he interprets raśmí as ray:
“Their ray extended light across the darkness: 
But was the One above or was it under?”51
Professor Jurewicz excludes the meaning 'cord' for raśmi in the Ṛgveda. For 
her raśmi means only 'ray' or 'reins'.52 But I cannot see convincing reasons that 
lead to such a clear isolation of the meaning of raśmi. It could clearly have this 
connotation in the case of reins.
Professor Jurewicz could have accepted this meaning too. She pointed out 
in the Introduction that the associations of the recipients of the hymns could 
encompass a very wide semantic range, and she also tried to preserve the 
ambiguity of the original.53 In three important cases she rightly allowed both 
alternatives. See, for example, her comments on stanza 1 of the Nāsadīya:
The form ā́varīvar is usually interpreted as derived from ā́ √vṛt 
('What was moving?'). Macdonell however proposes to derive it 
from ā √vṛ ('What was concealing?'). Both interpretations can be 
justified on the basis of later stanzas of the Nāsadīya. The answer 
to the question about movement can be found in the second stanza, 
which describes That One as breathing — so moving in some way. 
The answer to the question about concealment can be found in the 
third stanza presenting the state of darkness hiding the darkness."54
50 Ibid.: 210.
51 Macdonell 1922: 19.
52 Personal communication.
53 "In my attempts to understand the RV I have assumed that the recipient of this text was 
immersed in his contemporary culture and well versed in the RV itself. Its memorisation, which 
would have been usual in an oral and story telling culture meant that the recipient's associations 
could encompass a very wide semantic range. In my English translation of the stanzas I have tried 
to preserve the ambiguity of the original because it is an important way by which the poets prompt 





“It is not accidental that the second part of the phrase tuchyénābhv 
can be understood both as ābhū́ – 'that which is about to be' and as 
ābhú – 'that which is not, that is empty, void'. This expresses the 
idea that inside the void there is a part of reality which is about to 
be but which does not exist yet at this creative stage.”55
As well as stanza 4:
“The first hemistich of the stanza is usually translated differently: 
it is assumed after Macdonell 1917 that yád refers to kā́ma and 
mánaso rétas qualifies the desire and not ābhú/ābhū. ...However, 
we can also interpret yád as referring to tád from verse a which 
in turn anaphorically refers to That One which was born through 
the power of heat, i.e. to ābhú/ābhū́. I think that the intention of 
the poet was to prompt the recipient to activate both senses of 
the hemistich and because of this its syntactic structure can be 
equivocally interpreted.”56
I am not asking why Professor Jurewicz did not translate raśmí as cord, but 
why she did not allow that meaning at least as an option.
This interpretation has also profound consequences. It can evoke (geometric) 
construction/measurement.57
Comment on the book
The book includes the translations of only four complete hymns: ṚV V. 63, VI. 
9, X. 124 and X. 129. In addition, it quotes extensively from three hymns: ṚV 
IV. 1 (stanzas 10‒18), IV. 58 (stanzas 1‒9 and 11) as well as from VI. 1 (stanzas 
1‒4). This is not necessarily a problem, in fact a lot of hymns are compilations, 
however providing the complete text can be helpful in many cases.
55 Ibid.: 49.
56 Ibid.: 51.
57 In fact, raśmí can evoke measurement even with the meaning 'ray' as can be seen from the 
following stanza: pári yó raśmínā divó 'ntān mamé pṛthivyā́ḥ (RV 8.25.18.) [He] who measured 
(√mā) with his ray (raśmi) the ends of heaven and of earth on every side. Cf. Brereton – Jamison 
2014: 1082. See also Fórizs 1989, 1995, 2005.
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And the last question
Our interpretations are in fact close to each other: 
"Neither the non-existent nor the existent existed then.
Neither the midspace nor the heaven beyond existed."58
There are still no building blocks,
The joints of existence and non-existence 
have not congealed yet;
There is no time, no space, no matter;
There is neither existence nor non-existence,
There is nothing.
But this nothing is more than existence
More than non-existence.
Everything is still possible,
No fate has been determined yet:
This nothing is free.
That One has not secernated yet.59
The only difference in our understanding is [her assumption of] the 
[perfect] completeness/fullness of the starting point, and the perspective 
concomitant to it:60
"... [I]n the precreative state, reality does not cognise because it 
does not want to cognise and not because it cannot do so due to 
any inner or outer limit. That would mean that the precreative 
state is understood as the state of the Absolute in the same way 
it is defined in European metaphysics: as perfect fullness without 
any lack which could justify future creation... The Absolute does 
58 Cf. "The non-existent did not exist, nor did the existent exist at that time. / There existed 
neither the midspace nor the heaven beyond. // What stirred? From where and in whose protection? 
/ Did water exist, a deep depth?" (Brereton 1999: 250.) The Hungarian translation of the Nāsadīya 
was made by me in 1976 in Pannonhalma, and I used this rendering in my poetic re-creation 
(Fórizs 1989, 1995).
59 Fórizs 1995: 157. In pp. 153–170 I consider the Nāsadīya as a series of enigmatic formulas 
(brahman); and I weave the new (contemporary) cloth (texture) of the hymn of creation by 
drawing the woof of my own words through the warps of these brahmans.
60 But in this case it is almost everything.
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not need the world and is not forced to create it. But it can — if 
it wills that."61
First of all, it seems problematic to assert anything about the precreative state. 
So it is at least very misleading to talk about it as "the state of the Absolute".62
The adjective perfect and full also appears in the following passage though it 
is not quite clear what 'the perfect and full Absolute' refers to:
"It also seems probable that the idea of being a not-cognizing ātman 
may constitute one of the meanings of avidyā, which is the source 
of all the successive events inevitably leading to entanglement in 
the empiric world. This inevitability is also present in the Vedic 
cosmogony: once ātman manifested his inability to cognize, the 
rest of the creative process became a constant attempt to fill the 
epistemic and ontological gap which appeared in the perfect and 
full Absolute."63 
In other places Professor Jurewicz identifies the Absolute (or the creative 
power of the Absolute) with tád ékam.64
So she starts with the Absolute (tád ékam) and the perfectness and fullness 
of it is assumed. This might be a legitimate assumption, but I do not share it 
with her. 
For me the poet of the Nāsadīya and some of the greatest seers of the 
Ṛgveda are distinguished from the thinkers of later times by the unique 
perspective they made it possible to achieve: their starting-point is, in a sense, 
the incomplete. 
61 Jurewicz 2010: 47.
62 A similar expression ('pre-creative state of reality') was also used in her analysis of the Vedic 
correspondent of the first nidāna: "The actual term avidyā does not appear in Vedic cosmogony. 
But the ability to cognize appears in it. Firstly, the pre-creative state of reality is identified with 
the state of being unknowable." (Jurewicz 2000: 81.)
63 Ibid.: 81.
64 tád ékam is also referred to as the Creator (ibid.: 94), and the equivalence of the Creator 
and ātman also appears on the bases of BU 1.4 (ibid: 82). Elsewhere she talks about 'the final 




Completeness and wholeness is not the beginning but the end.65 Instead of 
undergoing the transformations of an already existent ātman, we are taking part 
in the [re]creation of it:
"From the dark I go into the multicolored, and from the multicolored 
into the dark. Shaking off evil, like a horse its hair, and freeing 
myself, like the moon from Rahu's jaws, having [re]created the 
ātman66, cast off the body, I attain the uncreated world of brahman, 
I attain [the uncreated world of brahman]."67
This perspective makes an appearance even in some [early] parts of the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad:68
bráhma vā́ idám ágra āsīd ékam evá | tád ékaṃ sán ná vyàbhavat.
""In the beginning this world was only bráhman, only one. 
Because it was only one, bráhman had not fully developed." 
(BU 1.4.11.)69
sá eṣá ihá práviṣṭa ā́ nakhāgrébhyo yáthā kṣuráḥ kṣuradhāné 
'vahitaḥ syā́d viśvambharó vā viśvambharakulāyé | táṃ ná 
páśyanty ákṛtsno hí sáḥ prāṇánn evá prāṇó nā́ma bhávati vádan 
vā́k páśyaṃś cákṣuḥ śṛṇváñ chrótraṃ manvānó mánas | tā́ny 
asyaitā́ni karmanāmā́ny evá | sá yó 'ta ékaikam upā́ste ná sá 
vedā́kṛtsno hy èṣó 'ta ékaikena bhávati | ātméty evópāsītā́tra hy èté 
sárva ékaṃ bhávanti.
"Penetrating this body up to the very nailtips, he remains there like 
a razor within a case or a termite within a termite-hill. People do 
not see him, for he is incomplete as he comes to be called breath 
65 This is the mystery of "re-creation" (a constructive, self-transcending act of the 
participant). See Fórizs 1995, 2005, 2013c and [2003/]2016b.
66 kṛtātman, '[someone] with [re]created-ātman' (bahuvrīhi compound). The [re-]created ātman 
is not the beginning, but the end: the completion of the process; and the completeness is achieved 
[by my deeds] in the world. From the One through the Many to the Whole.
67 aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpaṃ candra iva rāhor mukhāt pramucya dhūtvā śarīram akṛtaṃ 
kṛtātmā brahmalokam abhisaṃbhavāmīty abhisaṃbhavāmi, ChU 8.13. Cf. Olivelle 1998, 287. 
He translates "I, the perfected self  (ātman), cast off the body, the imperfect, and attain...".
68 I give the text in Patrick Olivelle's translation.
69 Olivelle 1998: 49.
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when he is breathing, speech when he is speaking, sight when he is 
seeing, hearing when he is hearing, and mind when he is thinking. 
These are only the names of his various activities. A man who 
considers him to be any one of these does not understand him, 
for he is incomplete within any one of these. One should consider 
them as simply his self (ātmán), for in it all these become one." 
(BU 1.4.7.)70 
saìṣā́ bráhmaṇó 'tisṛṣṭir | yác chréyaso devā́n ásṛjatā́tha yán 
mártyaḥ sánn amŕ̥tān asṛjata, tásmād átisṛṣṭir|átisṛṣṭyāṃ 
hāsyaitásyāṃ bhavati yá eváṃ véda
"This is bráhman's supercreation. It is a supercreation because 
he created the gods, who are superior to him, and, being a mortal 
himself, he created the immortals. Anyone who knows this stands 
within this supercreation of his." (BU 1.4.6.)71
sá naìvá vyàbhavat|tác chréyo rūpám átyasṛjata dhármaṃ|tád etát 
kṣatrásya kṣatráṃ yád dhármas|tásmād dhármāt páraṃ nā̀sti
"It still did not become fully developed. So it created the Law 
(dharma), a form superior to and surpassing itself. And the Law is 
here the ruling power standing above the ruling power. Hence there 
is nothing higher than the Law." (BU 1.4.14.)72
This perspective has been changed irrevocably in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 
with Uddālaka āruṇi: 
sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam|tad dhaika āhur 
asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam|tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata
kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovāca|katham asataḥ saj 
jāyeta|sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam
"In the beginning, son, this [world] was simply what is existent 






this point some do say: 'In the beginning this [world] was simply 
what is nonexistent (asat) — one only, without a second. And from 
what is nonexistent was born what is existent.'"
"But, son, how can that possibly be?" he continued. "How can what 
is existent be born from what is nonexistent? On the contrary, son, 
in the beginning this [world] was simply what is existent (sat) — 
one only, without a second. (ChU 6.2.1‒2.)73
Professor Jurewicz is also aware of the fact that "this Upaniṣadic concept of 
reality simplifies the ideas of the Nāsadīya:
"The hymn presents a vision of creation in which precreative reality 
is neither being/truth (sát) nor non-being/untruth (ásat). ...In later 
thought the word sát generally refers to the unmanifested aspect, 
ásat to the manifested."74 
This reversal can be seen in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.3.28 where:
"sát denotes what is unmanifested, immortal and full of light, 
while ásat denotes the dark, mortal manifested world. It is 
also attested by Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1‒2 which negates 
the possibility of origination of the world out of non-being/
untruth (ásat) and considers being-truth (sát) as the source of 
creation."75 
However, what has been changed is not only the denotation of sát and ásat, 
but also the very perspective.76 A perspective from which it can be clearly seen 
that no independent substance is possible here: neither an independent existent 
(sát) nor an independent non-existent (ásat).77 Later on this perspective was lost, 
and no one else than the Buddha found it. 
73 Ibid.: 247.
74 Jurewicz 2010: 52.
75 Ibid.: 52.
76 Cf. Fórizs 1989, 1995; see also Fórizs 2002: 112.
77 Uddālaka āruṇi assumes nothing else than this independence, when he replaces the 
independent – one without a second – non-existent (asad ... ekam evādvitīyam) with the 




nāsa̍d āsī̱n no sad ā̍sīt ta̱dānī̱ṁ nāsī̱d rajo̱ no vyo̍mā pa̱ro yat |
kim āva̍rīva̱ḥ kuha̱ kasya̱ śarma̱nn ambha̱ḥ kim ā̍sī̱d gaha̍naṁ 
gabhī̱ram ||1.
na mṛ̱tyur ā̍sīd a̱mṛta̱ṁ na tarhi̱ na rātryā̱ ahna̍ āsīt prake̱taḥ |
ānī̍d avā̱taṁ sva̱dhayā̱ tad eka̱ṁ tasmā̍d dhā̱nyan na pa̱raḥ kiṁ 
ca̱nāsa̍ ||2.
tama̍ āsī̱t tama̍sā gū̱ḻham agre̍ 'prake̱taṁ sa̍li̱laṁ sarva̍m ā i̱dam |
tu̱cchyenā̱bhv api̍hita̱ṁ yad āsī̱t tapa̍sa̱s tan ma̍hi̱nājā̍ya̱taika̍m ||3.
kāma̱s tad agre̱ sam a̍varta̱tādhi̱ mana̍so̱ reta̍ḥ pratha̱maṁ yad āsī̍t |
sa̱to bandhu̱m asa̍ti̱ nir a̍vindan hṛ̱di pra̱tīṣyā̍ ka̱vayo̍ manī̱ṣā ||4.
ti̱ra̱ścīno̱ vita̍to ra̱śmir e̍ṣām a̱dhaḥ svi̍d ā̱sī3d u̱pari̍ svid āsī3t |
re̱to̱dhā ā̍san mahi̱māna̍ āsan sva̱dhā a̱vastā̱t praya̍tiḥ pa̱rastā̍t ||5.
ko a̱ddhā ve̍da̱ ka i̱ha pra vo̍ca̱t kuta̱ ājā̍tā̱ kuta̍ i̱yaṁ visṛ̍ṣṭiḥ |
a̱rvāg de̱vā a̱sya vi̱sarja̍ne̱nāthā̱ ko ve̍da̱ yata̍ āba̱bhūva̍ ||6.
i̱yaṁ visṛ̍ṣṭi̱r yata̍ āba̱bhūva̱ yadi̍ vā da̱dhe yadi̍ vā̱ na |
yo a̱syādhya̍kṣaḥ para̱me vyo̍ma̱n so a̱ṅga ve̍da̱ yadi̍ vā̱ na veda̍ ||7.
(RV 10.129, input by Holland and Van Nooten 1994, version by Eichler.)
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